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LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINT UPON HOURS OF LABOR AS A HEALTH
REGULATION.
It is indisputable that the validity of legislative attempts to
restrict hours of employment must rest either upon the fact that
the employment attempted to be regulated is public in character
or, if private, that it is of such a nature as to justify the exercise of
the police power of the State. Statutes of the latter class, at-
tempting to -restrict the hours of daily labor of men engaged in
private employments and thus necessarily abridging the right of
individuals to contract with reference to their own labor, are one
of the most marked characteristics of legislation in recent years.
The constitutionality of such statutes has usually been sought to
be sustained on the ground that the exceptional nature of the
employments concerned demanded such legislation for the protection
of the public health.
In the case of State v. Holden, 14 Utah 7, the constitutionality
of a statute forbidding the employment of workingmen for more
than eight hours per day in underground mines and in the smelting,
reduction or refining of ores or metals, and making it a misdemeanor
to employ a person for a longer period per day in such work, was
challenged as being a denial of the equal protection of the laws and
an arbitrary interference with personal liberty and private property
without due process of law. This statute could, perhaps, have been
sustained under a provision of the Utah constitution directing that
"the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety
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of employees in factories, smelters and mines" (Const. Utah. Art. 16,
Sec. 6), but the decision does not rely solely upon this provision.
Discussing the question on broad principles Df constitutional law,
the court held that the act, having a direct relation to the public
health, was a valid exercise of the police power of the State. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States this statute was
held, by a divided bench, to be not obnoxious to any provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. The decision of the Utah court has zince
been reaffirmed in Short v. Mining Co., 20 Utah 20.
On the other hand, in a carefully considered opinion, the Supreme
Court of Colorado has declared a statute similar to the one above
referred to, unconstitutional as class legislation and an unwarrantable
interference with the right of acquiring and possessing property.
Inre Morgal, 26 Col. 415. Cf. In re Eight Hour Bill, 21 Colo. 29.
The Colorado court denies that the protection of the individual
against injury to himself is within the police power of the State, and
seeks to distinguish the case before it from State v. Holden, supra,
in that the decision in the latter case was justified by the con-
stitutional provision above quoted, which is not to be found in the
Colorado constitution.
Squarely opposed to In re Morgan stands the recent case of In
re Boyce, 75 Pac. i (Nev.), where again the constitutionality of an
act practically identical with the Utah statute above mentioned is
involved. In this case the Supreme Court of Nevada denies that
Art. I6, Sec. 6 of the Utah constitution did or could confer any
power on the legislature of that State which it would not otherwise
possess and, following the decision in Holden v. Hardy, supra, holds
that the act under consideration, having for its object the protection
of the health of the workingmen affected and the resulting welfare
of the State, must be regarded as a valid exercise of the police
power. Belknap, C. J., dissents on the ground that the police power
of the State does not extend to the protection of the individuals
concerned against the consequences of their own acts, and declares
the act to be repugnant to constitutional guaranties of freedom of
contract.1
A case much nearer the border line than any of the preceding is
People v. Lochner, 69 N. E. 373, decided in January last by the
Court of Appeals of New York. By a bare majority of the court
the decision of the Appellate Division (73 App. Div. 2I), sustaining
the constitutionality of Section iio of article 8 of the New York
Labor Law, is affirmed. The provision in question constitutes it a
misdemeanor for an employer to require or permit any employee
to work in a bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty
hours in any one week, or more than ten hours a day, except for
the purpose of making a shorter workday on the last day of the
week. The court asserts that bakers are to be classified with "potters,
1The validity of similar legislation has also been upheld by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in the case of State v. Cantwell, 78 S. W. 569.
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stonecutters, file grinders, and other workers whose occupation
necessitates the inhalation of dust particles, and hence predisposes
its members to consumption"; and that for hygienic reasons the
peculiar nature of this occupation renders the restriction of long
hours necessary for the protection both of the employees themselves
and of the general public who take their wares. A strong argument
against the constitutionality of this statute is presented in the dis-
senting opinion of Judge O'Brien.
From the above decisions it is patent that the general tendency
of the courts is to uphold the power of the legislature to regulate
the hours of adult male labor in private employments whenever the
employment involved may fairly be deemed inimical to the health
of employes and the resulting welfare of the State. And in some
jurisdictions it has further been held that in the protection of the
public health the legislature may regulate the hours of labor in
occupations involving excessive or exhaustive labor, although not
in themselves detrimental to health. Thus "Sunday Barber Laws"
have. been sustained as health regulations. People v. Havnor, 149
N. Y. 195; People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151. And laws regulating'the
hours of railway employees. People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y. 554. It
has been said that the legislature may interfere whenever the public
health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected
against himself. "The State still retains an interest in his welfare
however reckless he may be." Holden v. Hardy, supra. From
these decisions, however, the inference by no means follows that
the power of the legislature to enact laws of a penal character limiting
the hours of daily labor in all private employment must be conceded.
Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127.
By the great weight of authority, the constitutional objections
to laws of the above character are not applicable when such legislation
is directed towards female labor only. That the labor of women
can be regulated for the protection of their own health is conceded
in most jurisdictions. Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12o
Mass. 383; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602; Wenham v. State, 91
N. W. 421 (Neb.). But upon this point also there is a conflict
of authority. Ritchie v. People, 155 IIl. 98. And see Tiedeman on
State & Federal Control of Persons and Property, Sec. 102.
It is to be noted that laws regulating the hours of labor in private
employments rest upon entirely different principles from those regu-
lating hours of labor in employments of a public character. The
State as an employer may dictate to those directly employed by it
on State, county or municipal works the hours within which they
shall labor. Such statutes are not based upon considerations of
public health, nor is it necessary that resort be had to the police
power of the State for their justification. Atkin v. Kansas, 191
U. S. 207. It is only where the labor is performed by employees of
an independent contractor for public work that some courts hold
there may be a question as to the valid exercise of the police power.
People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. i. This class of cases is obviously not
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in point, and is mentioned only because the distinction has sometimes
appeared to be ignored. Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274.
It is undeniable that the right of contract is subordinate to certain
restrictions which the State may impose in the protection of the
public health, safety or morals. With the expansion and increasing
complexity of industrial pursuits, the imposition of new and ad-
ditional restrictions is justified; and thus the undefined limits of the
police power become still more vague. The legislation under con-
sideration makes it apparent that the protection of the public health,
if not that of the employees themselves, seems to necessitate State
regulation of hours of labor in certain private employments where
a generation ago such statutes would clearly have been held un-
constitutional. And in view of the general disposition of the courts
to sustain the validity of such legislation whenever there "are reason-
able-grounds for believing that the restriction is the result of a proper
exercise of the police power of the State," further development of
this subject in the near future may fairly be anticipated.
UNCERTAINTY OF BENEFICIARIES IN CHARITABLE TRUSTS.
Thompson/s Ex'r v. Brown 24 Ky. Law Rpts. io66, 70 S. W.
674, (Dec. 3, 19o2.). A bequest of the proceeds of certain realty,
together with the residue of the testator's estate, to be collected by
her executor, "and by him distributed to the poor, in his discretion,"
is void for indefiniteness of beneficiaries. Buonam and Paynter, J.J.,
dissenting. This case was discussed in the Comment in the March
1903 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 12 Y. L. . 323, 324, 325, 326, and se-
verely criticised as reaching an incorrect conclusion. The case had
been remanded to the Circuit Court of Marion Co., Kentucky, for
proceedings in accordance with the decision, and on appeal it again
came before the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, which reversed its
previous ruling, thus supporting the conclusion of the YALE LAW
JOURNAL in its criticism of the previous decision. The later de-
cision is given in Thompson's Ex'r v. Brown, 25 Ky. Law Rpts.,
75 S. W. 210 (June 17, 19o3), 62 L. R. A. 398.
